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Trade liberalization, hoped to be achieved through WTO Agreement on Agriculture 
(AoA) is expected to lead to export promotion and import substitution opportunities 
for Indian food sector.  However, these opportunities cannot be exploited unless 
serious attention is paid to two important WTO agreements – Agreement on Sanitary 
and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS) and Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade 
(TBT).  Due to the ‘experience’ and ‘credence’ nature of food products, trading 
partners impose import restrictions based on food safety and quality concerns.  These 
concerns are legitimised by S PS and TBT agreements.  Hence, to obtain maximum 
possible benefit from these agreements, India will have to improve its safety and 
quality norms to match the Codex standards and participate effectively in Codex 
standard setting meetings.  Moreover, it must ask for substantial amendments to some 
of the articles of these agreements which seem discriminatory in nature.  Finally, 
India will have to strengthen import monitoring mechanisms so that domestic food 
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1.  Introduction 
 
Almost six years have elapsed since various trade agreements were signed 
under the auspices of World Trade Organization (WTO,1995).  One agreement 
considered most effective in reforming food and agricultural sector was the 
Agreement on Agriculture (AoA).  The essence of AoA liberalization was that 
markets should be distortion-free, a standard thinking in neoclassical economics.  
AoA translated this thinking by aiming for improving market access and export 
competition and reduction in domestic support. This in-turn was to be achieved 
through tariffication of quantitative restrictions, and time-bound reduction in existing 
tariffs, export subsidies and domestic support.  An important assumption in the 
neoclassical thinking is that there is complete information in the markets and 
elimination of tariffs and subsidies will lead to free trade among nations. 
 
However, markets are not characterised by complete information preventing a 
smooth and distortion-free trade.  This aspect is extremely important in the global 
trade in food products. Traditional economics textbooks cite food and agricultural 
markets/products as examples of perfectly competitive markets with homogeneous 
products, however, nothing can be farther from the truth.  Individual food products are 
not homogeneous across countries; different countries and firms adopt different 
performance standards and safety and quality  norms; and, moreover, buyers cannot 
ascertain quality of food products merely by physical inspection.  As a result, AoA by 
itself cannot guarantee removal of all barriers to trade.  Two other WTO agreements 
address this concern.  They are:  Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures 
(SPS) and Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT). 
 
This paper is organised as follows:  In Section 2 motivation for SPS and TBT 
agreements is presented as a food quality regulation issue.  In Section 3 implications 
of various articles of SPS and TBT are discussed.  Essentially, I drive home the point 
that although SPS and TBT agreements are meant for promoting smooth flow of 
trade, some of the articles of these agreements have strong potential for creating 
unfair barriers to trade for the developing countries.  Finally, Section 4 concludes by 
raising renegotiation issues and the need for domestic reforms. 
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2.  Motivation for SPS and TBT Agreements 
 
In a full information environment, producers will produce various kinds  of 
quality foods and consumers will choose the precise quality combinations that 
maximise their satisfaction.  Figure 1 presents this standard neo-classical argument in 
Economics.  Consumer H prefers a high-quality food item and consumer L prefers a 
lower-quality item as reflected in their respective indifference curves U H and U L 
respectively.  Given the prices of the two types of quality foods, consumers make 
their optimum choices.  Forcing either of them to choose the quality combination 
chosen by the other would lead to lower satisfaction.  Moreover, in such case there is 
no need for any market intervention by government.  Henson and Traill (1993) and 
Viscusi, Vernon and Harrington (1995) give similar arguments in terms of demand 
and supply for food safety.  The limitation of the above analysis can be explained by 
drawing the distinction between Search goods, Experience goods and Credence goods 
(Nelson, 1970, 1974; Darbi and Karni, 1973).  For search goods, consumers can 
determine a product’s quality before they buy it by examining the product.  For 
example, preshipment physical inspection of bananas by the buyer is good enough to 
ascertain quality before bananas are exported.  The neoclassical analysis can hold 
good in this case.  The distinction between t he three types of goods is provided in 
Figure 2. 
 
For experience goods, buyers cannot determine the quality until they buy and 
use the products.  Here, if goods are of repeat-purchase nature, where choice is based 
on prior experience with product quality,  the market can take care of itself.  If 
consumers buy a product repeatedly, firm, which provides high-quality food product, 
can charge higher price.  Thus, market imperfection can be overcome by a firm’s 
reputation and repeat purchases.  Meat products are  a typical example of experience 
goods.  Occurrence of food poisoning after eating meat products can be immediately 
related to the presence of E -coli or salmonella in meat products.  If firms are unable to 
establish reputation then markets fail and external regulations are needed.  Moreover, 
there is a moral hazard for producers if they sell experience goods to one-time 
consumers.  Fly-by-night operators exporting meat products to West Asia as a one-























Furthermore, food items can also be classified as credence goods where 
consumer information stays imperfect both before and after the purchase.  Many times 
consumers cannot establish for sure, the cause and effect relationship between 
contamination and ill-effects on health.  A producer may or may not know the quality 
and safety of a food product but consumers cannot discern quality both before and 
after the purchase.  E.g. adulteration and chronic effects of low-level exposure to 
pesticide residues and toxins can be dangerous to human health in the long-run.  To 
give specific examples, carcinogenic e ffects of DDT, lead and aflatoxins may become 
apparent only in the long-run.  Added to this are the issues related to negative effects 
of production and processing methods on environment and human resources (e.g. 
child labour).  
 
The analysis provided above shows that free-market economics cannot solve 
the problem of food quality as there are many imperfections in the market.  Certainly, 
markets can take care of food products which have the search-good characteristic.  
However, in host of other types, as discussed above, certain external regulatory 
mechanism is needed in the food sector.  Such external regulatory mechanism exist 
within a country, however, in the framework of global trade in food products, one 
needs to have a global understanding of food standards relating to safety and quality 
issues.  In the absence of such global mechanism, there is bound to be a proliferation 
of non-tariff-barriers to food trade.  Such non-tariff-barriers can and do nullify the 
global welfare improvement as envisaged by AoA.  Therefore, along with AoA, WTO 
also engaged the member countries to reach agreements on SPS and TBT which will 
aim at harmonizing food safety and quality norms of member countries and prevent 
unjust discrimination of imported food products.  I now tern to the discussion of these 
two important agreements. 
 
Classification of Food Products 
Search Goods  Experience Goods 
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3.  SPS and TBT Agreements and their Implications 
 
Under the auspices of WTO, SPS and TBT agreements were signed along with 
many other agreements including AoA.  In fact, AoA clearly endorses implementation 
of SPS agreement through its Article 14: 
 
“Members agree to give effect to the Application of Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures.” 
 
However, SPS and TBT agreements have not received the kind of attention they 
should have from industry and researchers alike.  There is a lot of confusion regarding 
understanding the difference between SPS and TBT agreements.  The distinction 
between the two is as follows –  The SPS articles refer to food and agricultural sector 
alone, while TBT measures refer to all products including food products.  SPS 
agreement aims to protect human, animal and plant life or health from pest and 
diseases arising out of imports of food and agricultural products.  On the other hand, 
TBT agreement deals with product specifications which include size, shape, weight 
and packaging material requirements including labelling and handling safety.  An 
illustration given in Figure 3 makes this distinction quite clear. 
 
Articles 3.1 and 3.2 of SPS state (paraphrased): 
 
"Members shall base their sanitary and phytosanitary
3 measures on 
international standards, guidelines and recommendations.  The 
sanitary and phytosanitary measures that confirm to the international 
standards, guidelines and recommendations will be deemed necessary 
to protect human, animal or plant life or health."  
 
For food products, the international standards, guidelines and recommendations refer 
to the guidelines suggested by the Codex Alimentarius Commission (CAC).  CAC is a 
commission established by World Health Organization and Food and Agricultural 
Organization (FAO).  Although the CAC guidelines have no backing of any 
international law, the WTO endorsement of these standards through SPS and TBT 
agreements has made these standards de facto mandatory.   
 
An important CAC guideline for food processing companies is to follow a 
food quality management system called Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Points 
(HACCP).  In fact, United States (US) and European Community (EC) have already 
made this system mandatory for food processing firms.  EC put a ban on imports of 
fish from companies in Gujarat which did not adopt HACCP system  (IE,1999).  
Moreover,  about 100 crores of herbal product exports from India, targeted for 1997-
98, were severely affected as US planned to impose ban on imports of these products 
if they did not confirm to HACCP (EFP, 1997).  Indian seafood processors, in their 
bid to remain competitive in the US market, are taking help from foreign consultants 
at exorbitant cost to implement HACCP in their production units (CP, 1997).  
However, one need not focus on export markets alone.  The dropsy-death episode in 
the edible oil market in 1998 is just an indication that Indian domestic industry has a 
lot of scope for improvement in agro-processing and food quality.  Multinational 
companies like Nestle-India have already planned to implement HACCP for coffee 
growing and processing (ET, 1997).   6

























However, things are not as simple as they appear.  No doubt, if India does not 
comply with the SPS articles, it may face non-tariff-barriers to trade.  But one must 
remember that many of the SPS articles favour the western nations.  For example, in 
continuation of Articles 3.1 and 3.2, Article 3.3 states: 
 
"Members may introduce or maintain sanitary or phytosanitary 
measures which result in a higher level of sanitary or phytosanitary 
protection than would be achieved by measures based on the relevant 
international standards, guidelines or recommendations, if there is a 
scientific justification … " 
 
This article was introduced at the behest of some of the western countries including 
US.  But this clearly amounts to undermining the importance of CAC standards and 
the harmonization principle of SPS agreement.  CAC standards are based on scientific 
justification, and, once WTO endorses the international standards set by CAC, there is 
no need to allow countries to set standards stricter than the CAC standards. 
 
  There are numerous examples of non-tariff-barriers to trade encountered by 
the developing countries.  Here are a few examples that affect India in particular: 
 
•  The requirement for aflatoxin content in groundnut is decided at 15 parts per 
billion (ppb) by CAC.  Indian laws permit 30 ppb.  Thus, there  is room for 
improvement in the Indian standard.  However, despite the CAC guideline of 
15 ppb, EC has a stricter aflatoxin standard of only 4 ppb.  Thus, even if 
Indian standards are improved to match the CAC standards, EC standards 
Canned Fruit Juice 
Specifications  regarding 
content and packaging 
Objective: 
Contents should not be 
harmful to human health. 
 
Specifications: 
Microbial, toxic and physical 
contaminants should be 
within the range specified by 
Codex. 
Objective: 
Standardization in packaging 
and handling safety 
 
Specifications: 
Standardization in weight, size, 
shape, material, labelling and 
safe handling requirements for 
the cans. 
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prevent any import of g roundnut from countries like India.  This is gross 
violation of CAC guidelines. 
 
•  Similarly, in India, 0.2 ppm lead content in milk is considered safe.  However, 
international requirements are 0.02 ppm. 
 
•  In one of the CAC meeting rounds, standard for sulphur in sugar was set at a 
maximum of 20 ppm.  However, Indian scientists established at a later date 
that sulphur content of 75 ppm in Indian sugar is also quite safe. 
 
•  Spain is known to ban imports of squid and other marine products on the 
grounds of heavy  metal contamination due to the presence of mercury.  
However, this ban is imposed mostly when there are excessive landings of 
these products by the Spanish fishermen.  The ban is removed when their 
landings are quite low. 
 
Then there are other articles which refer to infrastructure development in the 
developing countries and their participation in the CAC standards setting meetings.  
Article 9 of SPS agreement and a similar article for the TBT agreement (Article 11) 
mention that member countries agree to give assistance to developing countries, either 
bilaterally or through international organisations, in the areas of processing 
technology, infrastructure and research.  As per the clauses, this assistance may take 
the form of advice, credit, donations, grants and/or technical expertise.  However, no 
time-bound and concrete commitments are expressed in these articles.  Finally, 
Articles 3.4 of SPS agreement and Article 2.6 of the TBT agreement express the wish 
that developing countries should fully participate in the standard setting meetings in 
relevant international organisations such as CAC.  However, this remains only a 
wishful thinking as many developing countries do not have the requisite qualified 
personnel to actively participate in such meetings.  India is an exception to this, but 
nonetheless, our participation in such meetings is poor.  
 
 
4.  Summary and Policy Suggestions 
 
To conclude, AoA alone cannot guarantee freer trade in the food sector.  The 
reason is that due to experience-good and credence-good nature of food products, 
countries impose many restrictions on imports of food and agricultural commodities.  
The concerns of importing countries are valid as they would like to prevent any harm 
to their citizens, plant & animal life/health due to pest and diseases carried-in through 
imports of food and agricultural products.  However, imposition of these restrictions 
can and are also used to create unfair barriers to imports.  Taking this experience in 
account, SPS and TBT agreements guarantee the importing countries to adopt SPS 
measures, but, at the same time aim at preventing unjust discrimination faced by 
imported products. 
 
Having discussed the important articles of SPS and TBT, it becomes obvious 
that India will have to improve its quality norms by quantum leaps.  However, at the 
same time, one must realise that the SPS and TBT guidelines are decided by the 
member countries in the CAC meetings.  India must have a strategy for negotiating 
and arriving at just and fair food standards for its strategically important food   8
products.   Hence, policy prescriptions for India are two-fold.  One for the domestic 
reforms and other for strategic re-negotiation of SPS and TBT clauses.  Let’s consider 




•  Post-WTO experience abundantly indicates that Indian food industry will have 
to adopt HACCP as a strategic food quality management system.  HACCP is a logical 
system which emphasizes hygiene and prevention of contamination in the production 
process (Deodhar, 1999).  While big companies are incurring high costs to implement 
HACCP, the essence of HACCP can be effectively employed by small firms as well.  
For this purpose, government may give subsidy for the initial fixed costs associated 
with its implementation, and the recurring costs can be (and should be) borne by the 
respective enterprises. 
 
•  Indian food industry does not have a trained manpower to handle post-harvest 
quality management practices and food processing activities.  There is an urgent need 
to train labourers engaged in post-harvest practices and shop-floor workers engaged in 
food processing activities.  Setting-up of farm schools on the lines of Industrial 
Technical Institutes (ITI’s) should be given priority, where essentials of hygiene, food 
handling practices and processing are taught in certificate courses.  Such training be 
made mandatory to hire workers on farm or in processed food sector. 
 
•  Many of the food products imported into India contain weights measured in 
ounces and pounds.  Labels are many times w ritten in a foreign language, and the 
products contain additives that are not allowed by the Prevention of Food 
Adulteration Act (PFA) applicable to domestic products.  Thus, our laws need to be 
applied with equal force on imported products, and wherever s cience permits, 
domestic food companies be allowed to use recently developed food additives and 
preservatives so that they can effectively compete with the imported products.  For 
example, decolourant for buffalo milk is permitted elsewhere but not in India.  Nisin, 
an important preservative essential for tropical climates, is not permitted in India.  
These things need to be changed. 
 
•  We need many more state-of-the-art testing and analysis laboratories for 
examining the imported food products.  Investment i n such laboratories is absolutely 
essential, otherwise we will not be able to use the SPS and TBT clauses to guard 
ourselves against the harmful effects of contaminants in imported products.  The 
memories of the menace of parthenium species of grass that came along with the PL-




Strategies for Re-negotiations: 
 
•  The Article 3.3 of SPS as discussed earlier is quite discriminatory.  It allows 
countries to impose standards stricter than the ones suggested by CAC.  The examples 
provided in the earlier section are clear indications of unfair trade barriers.  In the 
coming round of renegotiations, India must oppose this article which undermines the 
importance of CAC guidelines and the principle of harmonization of food standards   9
among member countries.  In this regard, view of Dr. H. Nakajima, the Director 
General of WHO (in 1996) is very much supportive of what has been said above.  He 
states: 
Stricter Standards (other than Codex) do not necessarily offer better 
health protection and may be used as non-tariff trade barriers 
(Dawson, 1996). 
 
•  In fact, SPS agreement endorses guidelines of CAC.  However, more often 
than not, we never have a representation in the CAC meetings when the standards on 
various food products are set.  Due to lack of participation, standards get set which are 
unfavourable to developing countries.  Articles 3.4 and 2.6 of SPS and TBT 
respectively, encourage developing countries to participate in  standard setting 
meetings of CAC.  India must take advantage of this provision.  We must request 
FAO and WTO to facilitate such participation through subsidizing trips for the 
meetings and ask for organizing these meetings in developing counties. 
 
•  For effective participation in the CAC meetings India must be represented by a 
team consisting of food scientists, legal experts and economists in addition to the civil 
servants.  Currently, Ministry of Health is the nodal agency for CAC related issues.  
However,  ministries such as Ministry of Commerce and Ministry of Agriculture 
which are involved in administration of various food laws must also get involved in 
the CAC matters as they can better represent the industry and farmers’ perspective on 
SPS and TBT. 
 
•  Articles 9 and 11 of SPS and TBT respectively allow for assistance to 
developing countries for upgrading their infrastructure, food technology and research.  
However, no concrete time-bound commitments are expressed in these articles.  Thus, 
the articles remain only a wishful thinking.  If India has to improve its food quality 
standards sooner if not overnight to the CAC levels, then in the re-negotiations we 
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